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Experiences \\
Tith small regional integration schemes and their
attempts to shift the policy of industrialization., apart from
trade, policy, from the national to the regional level, hardly
give rise to exaggerated optimism,
However^ just as it is obvious that increased vertical linkages,
p
'size-effects" and external economies of a common strategy of
industrialization appear a priori to have positive repercussions on
the efficiency of first attempts at industrialization because of
the extremely small size of the home market^ it is definite that
there is a considerable gap between this conclusion and its conver-
sion into actual political measures, for instance, within the scope
of regional industrialization planning on the community level.
Up to now such a plan has not been set up by any of the most im-
portant integration schemes between the small developing coun-
tries, be it the East African Community (EAC), the Central
African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) or the West African
Customs Union (UDEAO) . Instead of this regulation., national de-
velopment plans with correspondingly narrow horizons now determine
the direction and the dimensions of industrialization policy within
these communities.
Parallel investments, excess capacities, suboptimal dimensions of
enterprises, inefficient productions with small radius of markets
being sheltered by high rates of protection and transport costs are
some of the results of the plans with mainly"national'"' character.
Furthermore;, the dissatisfaction with trade diversion and the fall
in customs-duty receipts from substituted third country imports
can induce the periphery states within the community to avert im-
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ports from member states by means of internal duties and quantita-
tive restrictions. The danger of an escalation of disintegration
measures was realized3 not only ex post, but also at the beginning
of the integration however., only these counter-instruments have
been set up at the community level which represent a compromise be-
tween the required national control and the necessary conceiving of
efficient industrialization in a "regional way".
Such a compromise is represented by the "taxe unique
1' system of
the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC).
It seems to be relevant to subject this system to an analysis, in so
far as the recently founded West African Economic Community (CEAO)
is going to take over this instrument in the form of the "taxe de
cooperation regionale" with effect from 197^. On the other hand,,
however., disappointment about the existing results of the
 rltaxe
unique" system was aired by the UDEAC.
The following analysis tries to show whether this disappointment could
be justified and where the weakness of this system could be located.
l lS§l_basis_of_t;he_^taxe_unigue^_system_of_ UDEAC_and_ it s_ func-
tioning:
UDEAC" s "taxe unique" system is based on the similar system of its
predecessor, the Equatorial African Customs Union UDE. The legal
basis for the UDE-system was the "Codification et Reglementation
de la taxe unique dans les etats de T Afrique Equatoriale" of
17.5.1960, which covered the four succession states of "French
Equatorial Africa
1': Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville (later P.R.Congo) u
Central African Republic and Chad. The T.U.system of the UDE stipu-
lated that
- on the application of individual companiess industrial productSj
with markets which covered or ought•to cover several countries
of the customs union, should be exempted from import duties and3 -
other import charges on inputs. (Art.1 and 2)s
- no further internal taxes on imported inputs and manufactured
products should be assessed (Art.3),
Q
- industrial products should instead be subjected to a single
tax,, the T.U. ,
- the proceeds from the T.U. should be distributed to the member
countries according to their share of imports.
- the decision of admission to the T.U.system should be trans-
ferred to a common authority, the
 ;lComite de Direction" (Art. 1),
-- the tax rates for a specific product should be assessed ir-
respective of the producer country and
- goods determined for third country exports should be excluded
from the T.U.system (Art.17).
The main effects of these stipulations with regard to the increased
regionalism of trade with domestic industrial products had been:
In the first place a common authority had been charged with the
admissions to the T.U.system and the assessment of the amount
of tax rates so that at least formally the T.U.system could have
served as a basis for a coordination of the national industriali-
zation plans on a regional level. ,
Secondly., tax rates for individual goods had been assessed uni-
formly for all countries; irrespective of the location of the
manufacturing industries, so that the system did not offer any
fiscal incentive for a shifting of location for manufacturing
industries situated in peripherical regions.
Thirdly, domestic consumption and exports had been charged with
the same tax rates. This proved problematic} in so far as a
possible conflict of interest between the producer country and
the import country had not been taken into account. While it couldbe essential for the import countries to be compensated at least
partially for diminished customs-duty receipts from third country
imports (trade diversion)s the producer countries pleaded for a
growth-promoting tax allowance for their production and exports .
into member states. A splitting of the regional market into partial
markets which would have been differed from each other by effective
rates of protection was therefore avoided in the UDE-phase.
Prom i960 until mid 1965 thirty-one enterprises received the T.U.
privilege: during this period it was noted that a regional as well
10 as a sectoral centre with foods3 beverages., cotton and leather
products was built up in Congo (Table 1). Gabon had a special po
sition in so far as it remained strongly connected with third
countries in regard to its exports^ a consequence of its isolation
concerning the traffic within the UDE as well as the export struc-





If one considers the T.U. as a substitute for an average import tariff
levied on all imported inputs. the nominal and effective rates of
12 protection of T.U. goods can be compared vis-avis competing
products from third countries3 provided that a constant share of
imported inputs (M) in the production value is assumed. This
offers the opportunity to calculate the regional preference which
the T.U. goods enjoy asa basis for further calculations concerning
the intra-regional trade incited by the common policy.
With regard to the nominal rates of protection analysis^ it has
to be taken into consideration that since 1962 a dual import tariff
had been relevant for the UDE, i.e. besides an import duty levied
on all third country imports which was dating from the colonial
periods a common external tariff had been in force since 1962.
However, the latter had not been applied to imports from Prance
and the francophone states of Africa., and was suspended on im-
ports from the remaining EEC members with regard to the exist-ing association regulations, in view of the dominating share of
UDE imports from France, the remaining EEC countries and from
the francophone African states (1963: 73.7 percent) it appears
quite sensible to restrict the analysis of nominal protection to the
common import duty. As, in this connexion, only the preferential-
tariff and customs duties are of interest, which were agreed upon
within the scope of the customs union on the community level,
national import duties on-particular products (e.g. on luxury
consumer goods) were not taken into consideration in the cal-
culation.
Table 2 shows that goods with a relatively high effective rate
of protection or with a high coefficient of effective and nominal
protection (escalation effect?also had relatively high shares in the
total supply on the regional market. This is valid for cosmetics
and hygiene articles, as well as for cotton., bicycles and small
tools (nails and bolts). However, it would be too early to deduce
from this a generally valid causal relationship between protection
and sales prospects on the regional market. Transport-intensive
and transport- sensitive products such as beverages (lemonade)
interrupt this relationship., since they enjoy additional competitive
protection vis-a-vis third centry products.
Products of a higher degree of manufacture such as clothing.-, shoes
and furniture had been less protected because of high T.U.rates
than was supposed under nominal protection. However^ the low shares
of domestic production in the total supply of these goods cannot
simply be ascribed to the high incidence of taxation and thus the
lacking protection. With increased manufacturing maturity the hete-
rogeneity of these goods is rising., transport costs are relatively
decreasing and, therefore> the chance for third country products
to penetrate the regional market despite high effective protection
of domestic products is growing. With regard to durable consumer
goods such as radios and furniture;i the preference of domestic
consumer for imported goods have to be taken into considerationas well as the fact that the UDE- states were in the first phase of
industrialization and3 if at all, produced durable goods which were
at the very beginning of the product cycle.
In general^ a lower cross price elasticity could be assumed for such
domestic consumer goods rather than for simple manufactured goods
such as cotton products. As disaggregated dates about the develop-
ment of intra-regional trade with T.U. goods during the UDE phase
are only available for the last year., 1965;, no conclusion can be
drawn on how far changes in the shares of domestic industrial pro-
ducts in the total supply have taken place since I960 and if so;
whether these changes could rather be attributed to higher price-
(tariff) - than to income-elasticities.
On the contrary^ as a summary of T.U. industries during the UDE
phase it can be presumed that successes in import substitution
strategy depended essentially on the shares of transport costs
and on the preferences of natives and foreigners with higher in-
comes to spend on high-quality imported manufactured.goods. If this
hypothesis was right., limits to import substitution policy on a
regional level would be established more rapidly than presumably
could be the case with respect to relations of factor costs and
rates of protection.
1966_
In 1966 a fundamental reform of the customs union,, as well as the
T.U.system based on itftook place. Cameroon was admitted to the
customs union and thus created a second more important regional
centre for industrial products apart from Congo. (Table 3). The
import duty deriving from the colonial period was substituted by
a considerably higher common external tariff which includes apart
from a customs duty (Droit de Douane),an import duty (Droit d entree)/
and the turnover tax an additional non- compulsory import duty
(taxe complementaire) which can be claimed by the members as a
substitute for abolished national import duties on various goods
at varying amounts.On account of the "taxe complement a Ire'- the customs union nominally
expanded into an economic union (UDEAC) is neither an economic
union (as yet no harmonisation of tax systems) nor a customs union
(no uniform external tariff on imported goods from third countries
into the member states);, but a free trade area.
The different tariff burden of imported goods according to import
countries is as essential for the analysis of the community tax
1 n
system as the new regulations., valid since 1966; according to
which the T.U. rates could differ for the same product according
17
to the producer country until 1.1.72. In the same way, the domes-
tic consumption of a T.U. article can be subjected to a different
tax rate than if it were to be exported to member states. The above
mentioned conflict of interest between the consumer and'producer
1 8
countries is taken into account by this rule. Both; the external
tariff and the T.U.- provoke a splitting of the regional market
into partial markets with various effective rates of protection. The
new T.U.system makes a fiscal incentive for production in periphe-
19 rical regions possible.
 y It is3 however, controversial whether the
new system can also contribute to compensatingdiminished customs-
duty proceeds from substituted third country imports or even to com-
pensating further reaching integration losses.
The point of view that
 ;ithe device is primarily to be considered as
a means of restoring the domestic tax base rather than as a means
20
of providing fiscal compensation for the cost of integration" and
"that the taxe unique does not. in itself- provide compensation for
21
the real loss involved in buying its partner- s higher priced products'
is in opposition to the opinion that ''the tax /_taxe unique_/ has a
similar objective to that of the Solidarity Fund^ i.e. to effect a
degree of equalisation in the benefits and charges accruing to the
22
individual member states as a result of the UDEAC
S
f or "in other
words the more products subject to the "taxe unique" that a country




venue duties it loses by buying the product from a regional partner
The existing results for the UDSAC clearly confirm that the T.U.
can only partly compensate for the diminished customs duty proceeds
resulting from trade diversion, since, on the other hand, provided
there are '"'high cost producers" within the union, competitiveness of
domestic products vrould be jeopardized. Furthermore it seems to be
clear that real income losses from trade diversion have been
25
accrued by all UDEAC partner countries. A preliminary answer to
the question^ whether the differentiating of T.U. rates promoted
an intra-regional specialization or whether it only sanctioned
'national" import substitution on the community level, can be given
by the analysis of effective rates of protection of T.U.goods on
the markets of producer and consumer countries.
Thus, two factors influence the determining of the difference in the
rates of protection: on the one hand., the different fiscal treat
ment of domestic consumption and exports into partner countries by
the T.U., on the other hand, the different external tariff burden
on competing import goods according to the import country of the
UDEAC. A calculation including both factors can lead to an answer
whether the trade policy of UDEAC not only built up barriers against
external imports but also promoted intra regional trade.
Effective rates of protection of T.U.industries in the UDEAC
Following the method applied in the UDE-case (M = 0.5) effective
rates of protection have been calculated for most of the important
UDEAC goods, according to whether the products have been consumed
in the producer country or whether they have been exported into
27 partner countries. These rates of protection have been related
to each other. A coefficient larger (smaller) than one thus means
that the effective protection of domestic consumption is larger
(smaller) than the protection on markets of partner countries. A
coefficient of one means that the protection of the market in the
producer country is the same as on the market in the import country.Algebraically this could be shovrn as follows:
Let t be the import tariff for the manufactured product in
Cameroon^ and t the import duty for the manufactured product
ca
in the CAR. Correspondingly, let t^. be the T.U. rate for the manu-
factured T.U.product on the consumption in the producer country
Cameroon, and t. ' the T.U. rate for the manufactured T.U. pro
duct on the export of the producer country Cameroon into the CAR.
R ' is the coefficient from the effective rates of protection




















states and for all possible import export combinations (Tables^
As Cameroon is the industrial centre of the UDEAC^, the analysis
of the rates of protection of its industries appears to be especially
relevant (Table 4). With the exception of its cotton-product
exports to the CAR and the essentially less important exports of
refined vegetable oil to Congo, the rates of protection of Cameroon s
T.U. industries are always higher on the domestic market than on
the markets of member states. However, as Table 5 shows., the protec
tion of the domestic cotton-manufacturing industry of CAR with 131
percent is just as high as the protection of competing Cameroon
exports into the CAR.
If the extent of the deviation of the coefficient from one is eval-
uated as indicator for a deviation from an ''optimum integration
area" in which imports from partner states are not discriminated
against in favour of domestic production (R = 1)3 the example of
Cameroon shows how far the UDEAC is from such a status. Instead,
the "national'
1 import substitution is fiscally sanctioned on the10
community level representing
 i;a means of limiting inter country
29 competition in the product in question." If transport costs are
regarded as additional internal duty on imports,. T.U. system and
transport costs will act together in the direction of a splitting
of the regional market into partial markets. In the case of Cameroon
it must be added to this that the external tariff protection is
mostly higher than that of the other partners because above all,.
Cameroon is assessing the additional import duty (taxe complemen-
taire) and thus protects its markets more strongly than the other
member states.
The unweighted average values in Table 4 show that the deviation
from the optimum status affects all Cameroon^ s partner countries
to almost the same extent apart from the T.U. relations between
Cameroon and Chad which have teen revised since 1968. However, it
might be noted that the transport costs between the partners dis
tort this homogeneous picture.
The results of CAR and Congo, being industrially the most important
UDEAC states besides Cameroon (Tables 5 and 6), appear less homo-
geneous.
The T.U. goods of CAR enjoy,* on an average^ a higher protection on
the Cameroon market than on the domestic market. Disregarding once
more the transport costs this would contribute to intensify the
intra -regional competition on the Cameroon market. A restriction
has to be made in so far as such a promotion of the intra-regional
exports is not valid for two of the most important CAR industries,
the cotton manufacturing and the bicycle industry.
The coefficients concerning the trade of CAR with Congo show slight-
ly discriminating distortions in favour of CAR s domestic consump-
tion, again v/ith the exception of the cotton manufacturing industry,
where the consumption of domestic goods is clearly preferred.
The T.U. trade with Chad (until 1968)and Gabon is quantitatively
unimportant.11 -
The r%ults of Congo's T.U. trade (Table 6) show analogies to the
T.U.trade of CAR in so far as the T.U.industries of Congo enjoy on
average a higher effective protection on the Cameroon market than
on the domestic market. It is. however, open to question whether
these preferences granted by the Community can compensate for the
competitive advantage of domestic Cameroon industries which is due
to high transport costs of Congo goods,
Objections against the effectiveness of T.U. export preferences
arise because Congo
1 s exports of T.U. products to Cameroon amounted
up to only 3<6 percent of all T.U. exports in 1970 and that exports
of Congo's T.U. products into the CAR amounted to 21.2 percent
although the coefficients Congo-CAR mostly had the value of one,
thus neither intra regional exports nor domestic consumption are
discriminated or preferred essentially. The exception is again the
cotton-manufacturing industry. It can be presumed that the trade
Congo-CAR enjoys an advantage in transport costs since the tra
ditional transport system, the 'voie federale" directly connects
the industrial centres of both states. Unfortunately, the coeffi
cients of the trade Congo Gabon and Congo Chad cannot support the
thesis that trade is influenced by transport costs rather than by
T.U.rates. On the one hand, Gabon has only a few T.U. industries
at its disposal and is situated peripherically with regard to trans-
port facilities within the UDEAC region^ and on the other hand Chad* s
T.U. privileges to T.U. industries were canceled two years after the
beginning of UDEAC because of its withdrawal from the Union.
If the information contained in Tables k • 8 is not classified re-
gionally, but sectorally, it will be possible to compare the
effective rates of protection of domestic consumption with rates
°f AH
1£9£$.s from neighbouring countries and to make statements
about the intensity of the intra regional competition with in
dustrial products. This all the more since all member states12
produce labour intensive and raw material intensive consumer goods
which are typical for the first phase of industrialization;e.g.cotton
manufacturing (NDB 5509). clothing (6101), shoes (6401) furniture
(9^01) and bicycles (8710). In the special case of the UDEAC paints
and lacquers (3209) as well as cosmetics (3306) must be added. While
the regional
 i7view
 ; does usually touch the producer' s statement
of problems as to how far the T.U. grants incentives for the export
or the domestic consumption, the sectoral view
: of the effective
rates of protection (not of the coefficients from the rates) takes
into consideration the consumer*s statement of problems as to how
far imports are discriminated against compared with domestic supply
Above all it could be clarified whether facilitated access possibili
ties to the markets of partner states have been granted to the
peripherical states Chad and CAR or, vice versa., whether the access
to markets of peripherical states has been rendered difficult for
industries of the central states, thus introducing quasi internal
duties on intra regional trade.
With regard to cotton-manufacturing products (Table 9) the first
question can be partially denied, since all imports on the CAR-
market as well as on the Gabon market, including the domestic supply
enjoy the same protection. However a preference for domestic supply
does exist on the Congo market. The same is true in Cameroon with
the only restriction that the products of CAR enjoy the same pro
tection as the domestic supply of Cameroon. Until 1968 the cotton
products of Chad a dominating sector for Chad s industrialization
process, profited by the T.U. protection vis-a-vis the competing
imports from CAR and Cameroon.
Results for men s clothing seem to refute the thesis of fiscal in
centives by the T,U. system in favour of peripherical states. Until
1968 imports from Chad had been allowed only a lower protection
on markets of Cameroon and CAR than the domestic supply of the
respective partner states..j, Bibliothek tia-a> i
fto Wftltvdrtsdiffifi Kiel
A similar picture with respect to the structure of rates of protec
tion for cotton is given by shoes (6401). In each case the domestic
supply is not discriminated against in favour of imports, in the
case of Cameroon and CAR it is even obviously preferred. On the other
three, more unimportant markets^ imports and domestic supply are
being equalized by the T.U. system.
Concerning cycles the products of CAR enjoy on all partner markets
at least the same or even higher protection than the products of
the importing country. The competing goods from Chad which achieved
the same (owing to transport costs even actually higher) protection
only on the domstic market, suffered from these preferences- The
structure of protection regarding furniture products (9*101) contains
elements of clear fiscal preference for domestic supply (Chad) as
well as those of non discrimination of imports (Cameroon). With
respect to cosmetics (3306), Chad had a privileged position, while
with respect to paints and lacquers (3209) the products of CAR.
Gabon and Congo have been fiscally put on one level.
If one measures the preferences of production in peripherical re
gions taking access possibilities to the main market of Cameroon
into consideration, then obviously only cosmetics (privileged: Chad)
and lacquers and paints (privileged: CAR, Gabon, Congo) fall in be
tween this category.
In all other cases domestic products of Cameroon have been granted
either a higher (clothing, shoes) or the same protection^ mostly
with imports from the CAR (cotton, bicycles, furniture, varnishes
and lacquers).
So the importance of the T.U, system lies primarily in the promotion
of national import substitution and only in the second place in the
expansion of intra-trade (export promotion) or the allowance of
fiscal incentives for peripherical areas.This policy can be seen insnalogy with the passing of time in the
industrialization process which can be observed in the world economic
division of labour. Import substitution is regarded as a ''training
field
?
i for export intensification. Of course, regarding such narrow
national markets as the partial markets of the UDEAC;. the efficiency
limit of import substitution is attained rapidly also with regard
to typical labour intensive products with low internal economies of
scale.
Therefore, it must be carefully considered, how the T.U. system could
be reformed, after finishing the first phase of protection of the
domestic production, in a second phase of gradual abolition of these
privileges.
The present handling of the T.U. is to be put on the same level
as the introduction of internal duties on intra regional imports
of industrial products, and therefore, it is comparable to the
'•'transfer tax
!
; system of the East African Community. The essential
difference in the handling within the East African Community, how
ever, is that of the introduction of internal duties by countries
whose irfra regional trade with industrial products shows a deficit,
whilst in the case of the UDEAC these internal duties have been im
posed mainly in favour of the industrial leader Cameroon.
The contribution of import substitution of T.U, industries to the
growth of finished-goods production within the UDEAC
As ascertained above, the T.U. system has up to now mainly favoured
the domestic consumption at the expense of exports into partner
states. This was shown most clearly with respect to Cameroon
1 s T.U.
industries. It has to be clarified whether the import substitution
and the contribution to the increase of industrial production
connected with it was to the debit of extra-regional or intra-
regional imports,, i.e. which protection was more effective, that ofthe external tariff or that of the T.U. system.
The lack of input-output statistics about manufacturing processes
in the UDEAC means having to fall back on the Chenery-model which
does not take into consideration the import substitution of inputs
required for the production of manufactured goods and thus reduces
31
the extent of import substitution. The extent is thus underesti-
mated i however> in case of the analysed sectors the mistake is not
as important because it is a matter of production of mostly simple
consumer goods with relatively few manufacturing phases and required
input goods.
To show the extent of the substitution of intra-regional imports,
extra- and intra-regional imports in the period of 1966 - 1970
(with Chad till 1968) on the one hand and only extra-regional im-
ports on the other hand, have been included in the total supply.
Both amounts of import substitution resulting from the application
of the Chenery model have been related to the absolute growth of
32
the domestic consumption of all domestic T.U. products within
this period;, in order to illustrate their contribution to this
growth. The difference in both percentages is identical with-the
share of intra-regional import substitution in the growth of domestic
production and there are the following possibilities;
1) The difference can be positive and larger (smaller) than the per-
centage which is allotted to the extra-regional import substitution,,
i.e. in the passing of time more intra-regional (extra-regional) im-
ports have been substituted by domestic production than extra-re-
gional (intra-regional) imports.
2) The difference can be positive and equal to the percentage for
extra-regional import substitution i.e. just as many intra- as extra
regional imports have been substituted.16 -
3) The difference can be negative and absolutely smaller (larger)
than the positive percentage of the extra-regional import substitu-
tion i.e. the share of intra-regional imports in the total supply
has increased. Extra-regional imports have been substituted and
the positive effect of the extra-regional import substitution for
the growth of domestic production has been larger (smaller) than
the negative effect of an increased share of intra-regional imports.
In the case of the increase in intra-regional imports absolutely
exceeding the extra-regional import substitution, the result would
be "trade creation''.
H) The difference can be negative and absolutely equal to the positive
percentage which is allotted to the extra-regional import substi-
tution. This would be the case of pure trade diversion. All extra-
regional imports would be substituted by intra-regional imports.
The sum of extra-and intra-regional import substitution would be nil.
5) The difference can be nil. Neither decreasesncr increases of shares
of intra-regional imports in the total supply have taken place. The
growth of domestic production was consequently based solely on
the substitution of extra-regional imports.
Table 10 shows the contribution of extra-regional and total import
substitution to the growth of domestic consumption as well as the
difference between them (Column 3,6,9,12,15).
According to this, the following results can be deduced:
a) The share of total import substitution in the growth of domestic
production was, on average, the highest in Chad and Gabon. That
speaks well for the "backward" situation of these countries, as far
as their industrialization process with manufactured goods is con-
cerned. The CAR, however, seems to have reached the limits of
import substitution more rapidly than the industrial leader
Cameroon^ whose production of T.U. goods shows the biggest growth- 17
rates of all countries during the period 1966 - 1970 (apart from
Gabon).
b) The substitution of intra-regional imports was mostly unimportant
for the growth of production in Cameroon so that only extra-regional
imports have been substituted. On the contrary„ however3 the
domestic production of CAR had to face more intra-regional imports
than all other member states. So the CAR proved to be the most
stimulating partner on the import side of intra-regional trade.
c) For the three other members intra-regional imports did not have
either an essential influence on stronger competition or stimulation
of intra-regional trade or on promotion of production growth by
import substitution. Only Chad
vs sugar industry (till 1968) and.
not as important, Chad' s and Congo's beer industries must be
exempted from this conclusion. Mainly in the case of sugar Chad
substituted considerable amounts of imports from Congo.
d) With the exception of the CAR the cotton-manufacturing industry
contributed the highest share to the growth of the domestic T.U.
production in all countries by substituting extra-regional imports.
Soap (CAR)j Cigarettes (Cameroon) as well as paints and lacquers
(Gabon) decreased in importance and fell back behind this leading
sector.
e) "Trade creation" effects in the above mentioned sense - where
the increase in intra-regional imports exceeds the decrease of
extra-regioraL imports - could only be noted with regard to the imports
of men'
1 s clothing and bicycles in the CAR. With respect to the
latter only an insignificant substitution of extra-regional imports
took place (0.04 percent of the domestic consumption of T.U. goods).,
since CAR could meet the domestic demand for bicycles almost com-
pletely with own production as far back as 1966.
f) "Trade diversion'
1 effects however> exceeded "trade creation"
effects as far as the size was concerned, but they remained relative
ly low. The imports of shoes as well as paints and lacquers in the
CAR, imports of soaps in Cameroon imports of cotton and perfumery18 -
in Congo as well as paints and lacquers in Gabon fell into this
category.
These "diversion" effects are in all cases partial^ and least of
all regarding imports of shoes in the CAR. i.e. only a small per-
centage of extra-regional imports has been substituted by imports
from partner states^ by far the largest amount by own production.
The fundamental result of the calculation of effective rates of
protection that the T.U. system promotes domestic consumption to
the debit of intra-regional trade, has not been refuted by the
measurements of import substitution. If one arranges these results
according to countries, a confirmation can be seen. Cameroon., being
the member state with the clearest protection of domestic production
vis-a-vis imports from member states, is practically excluded as
stimulating element for the intra-regional trade. On the other hand5
stimulating influence came from CAR., whose production of own T.U.
goods was not as strong. These differences however„ appear marginal
if one compares them with the preference of the substitution of
extra-regional imports: more important national differences can be
seen here. Partner states which had e.g. cotton - and leather-
manufacturing industries at their disposal even before 1966 (Came-
roon and CAR) appear to have approached the limits of import sub-
stitution by 1970^ while Congo and Gabon established these industries .
only after 1966 and thus show higher groxuth rates in the period of
observation. A similar fact is valid for Chad where the cotton-
manufacturing sector clearly dominates.
Conclusion
After the markets of the partner states have largely been closed
by their own production the question of expanding the national
markets beyond the limits of the UDEAC has to be put by the more
developed partners in an urgent way. It is shown that the instruments
of T.U.;, in spite of its reform in 1966, did not contribute to acoordination and specialization of national industrialization plans
on a community level., but on the contraryJ favoured the accumulation
of small handicraft businesses. However, it remains open to question
whether this development is the result of the opposing interests
of the central- and periphery regions. Certainly., a regional con-
cept had to.face unfavourable conditions of infrastructure and em-
ployment at the beginning of the UDEAC so that priority had to be
granted to protect small manufacturing enterprises with a very limi
ted market radius.
In any case; the T.U. system has promoted the third country imports
of inputs at the expense of intra- industrial specialization and
simultaneously subventioned the domestic production of homogeneous
goods. When, at the end of 1972 reflections'
5-
5 within the UDEAC^
taking the clothing industry as an examples have been made with
a view to,
- demanding a minimum percentage for delivery into partner states
as a prerequisite for the allowance of the T.U. privilege*
- refusing new enterprises the T.U. privilege,
•- excluding small handicraft businesses from the T.U. privilege^
stimulating the use of regional inputs in such a way that the
price of these inputs may exceed the price of third country inputs
by 15 percent and not as is the case now by 10 percent in order
to delete inputs from the list of exemptions from duty,
it will be quite clear that the T.U. system should in future pri-
marily serve the intra-industrial specialization rather than as up
to now, the subvention of every quasi-industrial activity without
regional reference.Table 1: Sectoral and regional distributicnof "Taxe Unique" indus-






































































The location of production has been taken as a basis and not the place
of business.
Number of enterprises.
Source: Journal officiel de la Republique du Congo, Brazzaville,
current years.Table 2 - Nominal and effective rates of protection of T.U. industries













Articles of plastic and synthetic
rubber Materials
Travel Goods of Leather
Cotton Products
Boy's and Men's Clothing
Footwear
































































Nomenclature Douaniere de Bruxelles
b Effective tariff - -j
Nominal tariff
P = domestic production (domestic consumption + export into the UDE-states!)
^ = total supply (imports + domestic production). The year of reference is 1965
d Sub-headings 330607, 33O6O8, 330631, 330641, 330642, 330651, 330652, 33O6S0
e Sub-heading 390739
f Sub-headings 550902, 550903, 550904.
S Sub-headings 640111, 640201, 640221, 640222
h Sub-heading 733101
x Sub-heading 851512
^ Sub-headings 940111, 940321, 940331.
Sources: Journal Officiel de la Republique du Congo, Brazzaville, current
years; Bulletin International des Douanes, Exercice 1958-1959. Fasd.
76/6













































































































































Number of enterprises, Deprivations of the T.U.privilege have not been
h considered. ^
 b
1 Since Chad withdrew from the UDEAC in 1968, its industries lost the T.U.
i privilege.
Source: Journal Officiel de 1'UDEAC, Bangui, current years 1966-1970Table 4 - Effective rates of protection of Cameroon's T.TJ. Industries
with respect to domestic consumption and exports into partner






Household products of Aluminium
Under Garment






Articles of Plastic and Syn-
thetic Rubber Materials
Motor Cycles
Trailers , Animal-Traction Vehicles
Varnishes and Lacquers
Vegetable Oils
' Iron and Steel Constructions
Waters
Wrought Plates, Sheets + Strip,
of A 1 urn inintn
Hydrocarbons
Hydrogen, Rare Gases









































































































































































































































































Sources: Bulletin International des Douanes, Union Douaniere et Economique
de l'Afrique Centrale, Fascicule 66 (l
 r
e Edition), Bruxelles I966;
Journal Offlciel de l'UDEAC, Bangui, current years.Table 5 - Effective rates of protection of CAR'S T.U. Industries with
respect to domestic consumption and exports into partner
states In percent in 1969
Products
Cotton Products














Builder's Carpentry and Joinery
Wood, planed
Waters








































































































Only the 6-digit sub-headings in question have been taken into account.































































































































Sources: See Table 4Table 6 - Effective rates of protection of Congo's T.U. Jnrinatri «.q _
with respect to domestic consumption and exports into part-







Articles of plastic and synthetic
rubber Materials
Furniture •
Travel Goods of Leather
Footwear
Varnishes and Lacquers






Bodies for Motor Vehicles
Railway + Tramway Goods Vans
Ships, Boats











































































































































































































































Sources: See Table 4Table 7 - Effective rates of protection of Gabon's T.U. industries
with respect t6' domestic consumption and exports into






lion and Steel Constructions
Tugs
Light-Vessels
























































a Only the 6-digit sub-headings in question have been taken into account.



































































Sources: See Table 4Table 8 - Effective rates of protection of Chad's T.U. industries
with respect to domestic consumption and exports into partner
states in percent in 1968
Products
Perfumery, Cosmetics




Parts and Accessories of Motor-
Cycles
Furniture




Iron and Steel Constructions
I
 a until 1968.
1



































































































































































Sources: See Table 4.
LTable 9 - Effective rates of protection of competing T.U.manufactured























































































































































































Sources: See Table 4Table 10 - Import Substitution of important T.U. Goods in the Central









Boy's and Men's Clo1hii£
?ootwear























































Import Substitution 1966-1970 in percent of the Growth of




































(3) = (2) -(1)










Import Substitution 1966-1970 in percent of the Growth of




















































Import Substitution 1966-1970 in percent of the Growth of
















































Import Substitution I966-I968 in percent of the Growth of
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-ioy's and Men's Clothiig
•lootwear ,
' Iron and Steel Products






















Import Substitution 1966-1970 in percent of the








































'The last two digits refer to the UDEAC tariff.











' Sub-headings 640101; 640111; 640201; 640221; 640222; 640229
JSub-headings 940101; 940321; 940331; 940390.
lources: UDEAC, Statistiques Generales, Commerce Exterieur, Brazzaville, 1966, .
1968, 1970, current years; Secretariat General de 1'UDEAC, Bulletin des
Statistiques Generales de 1'UDEAC, Brazzaville. : 1966,1968,1970.Footnotes
1 The term "small" regional integration schemes applies to the
African in contrast to the Ldin American communities. In this
connexion "small
1
1 is related to market ••• and not to geographical
size.
2 See for the evaluation of the relevance of size-effects:
P.Robson, Economic Integration in Africa, London 1968;, pp
90 - 91.
3 See Republique Centrafricaine, Plan de Developpement Economique
et Social 1967 - 1970, (Bangui 1967), p.248.See also Bulletin
d Information de I
1 UDEAC,Bangui,No 14, Juin 1973, p. 20.
4 Secretariat General de 1 UDEAC3 Bulletin des Statistiques
Generales de 1 UDEAC, Brazzaville., No. 33, Janvier 1971,
pp.80 - 81.
5 In the following an abbreviation for the French term "taxe unique"
will be used.
6 Union Douaniere Equatoriale.
' Journal Officiel de la Republique du Congo, Brazzaville,
Vol.3 (I960) pp.442-444.
8 The selling-price ex factory was the base of "ad valorem" tax
rates. (Art.16).
9 The document did not explicitly determine that the tax rates for
domestic consumption and exports had to be identical, but in
practice they were.The only exception was ammunition (nomenclature
of Brussels: 9307), where the exports to Chad and Central African
Republic were charged with a higher T.U. rate than the consumption
in the producer country P.R.Congo and the export to Gabon.
See Journal Officiel de la Republique du Congo, Brazzaville5
Vol.6 (1963) p. 207-
10 The formation of a central regional is mainly conditioned by
history and transport system, since Brazzaville was the administra-
tion centre of "French Equatorial Africa" until I960 and the
starting point of the only traffic axis Brazzaville - Bangui -
Fort Lamy (voie federale).
11 This supposition is all the less restrictive, the larger the re-
lative import content.
12 The effective rate of protection is calculated by the usual
formula r= t - M . t. by which t is the nominal external o 1 o
1 - M
tariff for the manufactured product from third countries,t. is the
external tariff for imported inputs and M is the relative^'import
content. In the following the T.U. rate is used instead of t..13 Regarding Central- and West African import-substitution industries.,
empirical case studies show values between 0.4 -- 0.5 for M on
sectors of textile- and leather manufacturing industries> so that
for the following calculations an M-value of 0.5 will be assumed.
See R.Gusten, Erfolgsbedingungen fiir Import substitution und Ex-
portdiversifizierung als Entv/icklungsstrategie in.Afrika. Jteper pre-
pared for the conference on "Problems of International Division of
Labour
1' sponsored by the Verein fiir Socialpolitik (The German
Economic Association) and the Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft an der
Universitat Kiel (Kiel Institute of World Economics-
1, Kiel, July
12-15 1973, P-19-
14 The "Tarif des Droits d Entree" was taken as a basis for
;'Afrique Equatoriale Francaise
n (Bulletin International des
Douanes. Exercice 1958-1959, Pasc.76 (6
e Edition); Bruxelies
1958), as well as tariff amendments up to 1963-
15 The calculation only contains T.U. goods with an "ad valorem" tax
rate., not goods with a specific tax rate. Affected by this re-
striction are beer, sugar and soaps charged with a specific
tax rate in the UDE.
16 See Art.62 of the "Traite instituant une Union Douaniere et
Economique de 1 Afrique Centrale" of 8.12.1964,
 ;'Journal Officiel
de la Republique Gabonaise", Libreville, Vol. 7 (1965) P- 352
as well as Acte No 12/65 - UDEAC - 34 about the
 i;Taxe Unique*',
"Journal Officiel de r UDEAC, Bangui, 1966 No 2.
17 This date was not kept. The T.U. rates also differ after 1.1.1972.
18 These new rules can be explained by means of the following example:
If T.U. enterprises produce clothing in Cameroon, the tax rate
will be 18 percent for the part of production which is consumed
in Cameroon, 28 percent for the export to Gabon., 32 percent for
exports to Chad (until 1968), Central African Republic (CAR) and
Congo respectively. At the same time, the T.U. rate for clothing
is 18 percent if it is produced and consumed in the CAR, for ex-
ports from CAR to Congo also 18 percent, as well as for exports
into the remaining partner states 22 percent respectively.
19 "Firstly an enterprise producing a product new to the region
could be offered a more favourable tax rate, if it were to agree
to locate in say Chad rather than Congo." P.Robson, Economic
Integration, op.cit.p.234.20 P-Robson, Current Problems of Economic Integration. Fiscal
Compensation and the distribution of benefits in economic
groupings of developing countries, UNCTAD, TD/B/332 Rev.l,
New York 1971, p.33-
21 Ibidem.
22 M.J.van den Ateelen and D.C. Hammond3 The Fiscal Aspects of
International Cooperation in Africa. The Experience of the UDEAC
and the EAC, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation,
Amsterdam, Vol. 23 (1969) No 3, p.100.
A.M.Akiwumi gave his opinion in a similar way. See A.M. Akiwumi,
Judicial Aspects of Economic Integration Treaties in Africa., in:
J.Rideau (Ed.) Les aspects juridiques de V integration economique,
Leiden 1972, p.57.
23 UNCTAD, Trade Expansion and Economic Integration among Develop-
ing Countries. TD/B/85/Rev. 1, New York 1967^ p. 2.6. Author
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emphasis.
2k See Secretariat General de 1 UDEAC, Etudes Satistiques, Supple-
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ville, No 6, Avril 1968.
25 See R.Langhammeri Handelsliberalisierung Oder gemeinsame Ent-
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beitrage, H.30, Kiel 1973, Table 8, p.15.
26 According to the used formula for the effective rate of projection
t as well as t. are different for each member state.
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Bulletin International des Douances. Fasc. 66., l
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e Ed., Bruxelles
1966, whereas the T.U. rates are mentioned in: Journal Officiel
de 1 UDEAC, Bangui 1966-1970,current years.
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 ;!Droit de Douane'
1 is levied. Besides the "Droit d Entree and the
"Taxe Compementaire" the turnover tax is taken into account. The
total external tariff t (in percent) is thus resulting from
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a
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